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apparent major problems.234 Similarly, the French civil law system
holds landowners to a high degree of responsibility, and yet has not
experienced "incessant verdicts in favor of the plaintiff. 2 35 If, in
fact, insurance rates do rise, the increase might be absorbed by
industrial and commercial concerns.23 6 This would be indicative of
Basso and Scurti's most important result -the partial shifting of
risk by expanding the duty of care on the parties who will, in many
cases, be able to prevent, insure against, and absorb the financial
loss of property-related injuries. Commercial entities can treat such
losses or insurance premiums as a cost of doing business. The
homeowner or apartment dweller of limited means, on the other
hand, may be protected by flexibility in the general standard of
reasonableness, 37 as well as by joint landlord liability. Hopefully,
the increase in potential liability will yield a decrease in future
injuries by placing landowners on notice that they will be held to
reasonable standards of care in the maintenance of their prem-
ises.238 The holding of the Court of Appeals in Basso is a welcome
step toward conforming the law to modern socio-economic condi-
tions and demands. Application of a single duty of reasonable care
will simplify litigation in the area of property-related injuries while
shifting liability to those who should properly bear its burden.
Jury need not be instructed as to the tax-exempt status of personal injury awards.
Damages awarded in personal injury actions are exempt from
both federal239 and New York State income taxation.2 40 Whether a
jury should be informed of this fact has presented considerable
difficulty for the courts. Recently, in Coleman v. New York City
Transit Authority,2 41 the Court of Appeals, following the view of a
majority of jurisdictions,24 2 held that a trial judge is not required to
234 Cf, e.g., Minoletti v. Sabini, 27 Cal. App. 3d 321, 103 Cal. Rptr. 528 (1972); Cappaa v.
Oscar C. Holmes, Inc., 25 Cal. App. 3d 978, 102 Cal. Rptr. 207 (1972); Fitch v. LeBeau, I
Cal. App. 3d 320, 81 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1969).
235 Hughes, supra note 224, at 684.
236 25 VAND. L. REv. 623, 637 (1972). See also 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 426, 432 (1969).
237 Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 106 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 939 (1973).
238 Hughes, supra note 224, at 691.
239 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 104(a).
240 N.Y. TAx LAW § 359(2)(e) (McKinney 1975).
24! 37 N.Y.2d 137, 332 N.E.2d 850, 371 N.Y.S.2d 663 (1975).
242 The majority of state and federal jurisdictions clearly prohibit any instruction to the
jury on the tax-exempt status of personal injury awards. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of
America v. Wilkerson, 327 F.2d 997 (5th Cir. 1964) (per curiam); Gerham v. Farmington
Motor Inn, Inc., 159 Conn. 576, 271 A.2d 94 (1970); Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 5 Ill. 2d
135, 125 N.E.2d 77 (1955). Some jurisdictions, however, have adopted the contrary position,
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charge the jury on the tax-exempt nature of such an award.2 43
The plaintiff in Coleman suffered amputation of both legs
below the knees when he was struck by defendant's subway train.
At a trial on the issue of liability, a verdict was returned in plain-
tiff's favor.244 The defendant contended that reversible error was
committed in a subsequent trial to determine damages when the
court refused to answer a jury query as to the taxability of the
award.245 Instead, the trial judge instructed the jury not to consider
potential tax consequences in determining the award. The Court
summarily rejected defendant's contention,246 although judge Ja-
sen, in dissent, urged closer examination of the underlying policy
considerations.247
It should be noted that the Coleman Court did not rule that it
would be error to inform the jury of the tax-exempt nature of the
award; rather, the Court held only that the trial judge is not
required to give such an instruction.248 Coleman may well be com-
and require instructions on this point when requested by counsel. See, e.g., Domeracki v.
Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 443 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 883 (1971); Dempsey
v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 251 S.W.2d 42 (1952). The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit stands somewhere between the two extremes, holding that while such an instruction
is proper, refusal to inform the jury of the nontaxable nature of personal injury awards is
not prejudicial error in the absence of a showing that recovery was increased as a result of
the failure to so instruct. McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & Hart. R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 39 (2d
Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960). See notes 249-51 and accompanying text
infra. A similar position was adopted in Anderson v. United Air Lines, Inc., 183 F. Supp. 97
(S.D. Cal. 1960). See generally Nordstrom, Income Taxes and Personal Injury Awards, 19 OHio
ST. L.J. 212 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Nordstrom]; Comment, Personal Injury Awards and
The Nonexistent Income Tax-What is a Proper Jury Charge?, 26 FORDHAM L. REv. 98 (1957);
Note, Income Taxes and the Computation of Lost Future Earnings in Wrongful Death and Personal
Injury Cases, 29 MD. L. REV. 177 (1969); 56 MINN. L. Rxv. 503 (1972).
243 37 N.Y.2d at 145, 332 N.E.2d at 855, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 670.
244 Id. at 139-40, 332 N.E.2d at 851, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 665.
245 In response to the jury's request for information on the taxability of the award, the
trial judge answered: "'Don't concern yourselves with that. It forms no part of your
deliberations. It is not an element to be concerned by you. Do not consider that at all.' "Id. at
145, 332 N.E.2d at 855, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 670. This response is similar to that suggested by
the Appellate Division, First Department, in Towli v. Ford Motor Co., 30 App. Div. 2d 319,
292 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1st Dep't 1968) (per curiam). Towli involved the same jury question as did
Coleman. After the jury had begun deliberations, they asked the trial judge: "Does the
plaintiff have to pay taxes on the award? If so, how are they computed?" The court
responded: "I instruct you, members of the jury, that the law does not permit me to instruct
the jury with regard to income taxes. I therefore cannot answer your questions as to taxes or
the payment of same." Id. at 320, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 9 (emphasis added). The appellate division
reversed the damage award and held that the trial judge should have instructed the jury that
they may not consider taxes in arriving at an award, rather than indicating that he could not
respond to their inquiry. Accord, Osborne v. Miller, 38 App. Div. 2d 298, 301, 328 N.Y.S.2d
769, 777 (1st Dep't 1972); cf. Kramer v. Chatham Green, Inc., 38 App. Div. 2d 931, 330
N.Y.S.2d 144 (1st Dep't 1972) (mem.). The Towli court, however, expressly declined to
indicate the appropriate response if counsel requests an instruction on the issue of taxes. 30
App. Div. 2d at 320, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 9.
246 37 N.Y.2d at 145, 332 N.E.2d at 855, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 670.2 47 Id. at 149-50, 332 N.E.2d at 857-58, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 673-75 (Jasen, J., dissenting).2 48 Id. at 145, 332 N.E.2d at 855, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 670.
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pared to the decision by the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in McWeeney v. New York, New Haven & Harford Railroad.249
The McWeeney court indicated that jury instructions regarding the
tax-exempt status of awards were proper,250 but refused to rule
that the failure to give such instructions constitutes prejudicial
error.
25 1
Supporters of the majority position argue that instructions
regarding tax consequences inject a collateral issue into the pro-
ceedings in that the plaintiff's tax liability is a private affair be-
tween himself and the government and has no legitimate bearing
on the litigation.252 Any instructions in this area, it is contended,
would confuse and mislead the jury and obscure the substantive
issues at trial.253 In addition, it has been suggested that since the
intent of the government in exempting the award from taxation is
to confer a benefit upon the injured party, it would be improper to
allow the jury to decrease the award because of its tax-exempt
nature.254 These arguments are based upon a presumption that the
jury, in arriving at an award, will confine its deliberations to those
elements it is instructed to consider.255 The absence of any refer-
249 282 F.2d 34 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960).
250 282 F.2d at 39.
251 Id. The McWeeney court reasoned that the failure to charge the jury concerning
taxation did not merit a new trial absent some indication that the jury had considered the
defendant's possible tax liability in computing damages. Id. at 39-40. The McWeeney rationale
was reaffirmed in Blake v. Delaware & Hudson Ry., 484 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1973). Judge
Lumbard dissented in both cases, declaring that an instruction concerning the tax-exempt
status of the award should be required. Id. at 208 (Lumbard, J., dissenting); 282 F.2d at 40
(Lumbard, C.J., dissenting). In Blake, he reasoned that "[t]his is one way in which our courts
can properly do something to curb escalating verdicts without subtracting one iota from a
fair and just recovery of damages suffered." 484 F.2d at 208 (Lumbard, J., dissenting).
252 See Kawamoto v. Yasutake, 49 Hawaii 42, 51, 410 P.2d 976, 981 (1966), citing
Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. v. McFerrin, 156 Tex. 69, 90, 291 S.W.2d 931, 945 (1956).
2'3 See Gorham v. Farmington Motor Inn, Inc., 159 Conn. 576, 581, 271 A.2d 94, 97
(1970); Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 5 Ill. 2d 135, 152, 125 N.E.2d 77, 86 (1955) (instructions
would inject an extraneous issue into the damage award). But see Feldman, Personal Injury
Awards: Should Tax-Exempt Status Be Ignored?, 7 ARiz. L. REv. 272, 280 (1966), wherein it is
argued that since such a cautionary instruction does not require introduction of any new
evidence and may dispel a misconception of the jury, it will have a simplifying rather than a
complicating effect on their deliberations.
2"4 Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 5 Ill. 2d 135, 152, 125 N.E.2d 77, 86 (1955). This
interpretation of legislative intent is questionable. It appears that the Revenue Act of 1918,
ch. 18, § 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1066 (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 104(a)), was enacted
primarily because of then existing doubts about the constitutionality of taxing personal
injury awards. H.R. REP. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1918).2 5 See Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 5 Ill. 2d 135, 149-5f, 125 M.E.d 77, 84-85 (1955).
See also Gorham v. Farmington Motor Inn, Inc., 159 Conn. 576, 581, 271 A.2d 94, 97 (1970)
(the limiting instruction is based on an unjustified assumption that the jury will not confine
their deliberations to the court's charge); Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Wilkerson, 327
F.2d 997 (5th Cir. 1964) (per curiam); Burns, A Compensation Award for Personal Injury or
Wrongful Death is Tax-Exempt: Should We Tell The Jury?, 14 DE PAUL L. REv. 320 (1965);
Feldman, Personal Injury Awards: Should Tax-Exempt Status Be Ignored?, 7 ARiZ. L. REv. 272
(1966).
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ence to taxation supposedly precludes the possibility of unfair
prejudice to any party.256
Whatever the merits of these arguments, it is submitted that
adherence to the majority position creates a very real possibility of
prejudice to the defendant. While the average wage earner is
highly conscious of taxation in general,257 the public is largely
unaware of the tax exemption accorded personal injury awards. 258
A serious danger exists that an uninstructed jury will arbitrarily
increase a personal injury award in order to compensate the plain-
tiff for taxes which the jurors mistakenly believe he will have to
pay. 259 Jury awards which do more than make the plaintiff whole
do violence to our notions of the compensatory nature of dam-
ages. 260 A cautionary instruction informing the jury of the nontax-
ability of the award and instructing them not to consider taxes in
their determination of damages261 would dispel any misconceptions
the jurors may have as well as provide greater assurance that the
award will be purely compensatory in nature. Rather than com-
plicating deliberations, as the majority view fears, such an instruc-
tion would simplify the jury's task by removing any possible confu-
28 See, e.g., Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 5 Ill. 2d 135, 151, 125 N.E.2d 77, 86 (1955).
The Illinois court assumed that the jury's reaction to such a charge would be to subtract a
projected tax liability from an award fairly arrived at through affirmative consideration of
the relevant damage factors. See also Nordstrom, supra note 242, at 234. But see McWeeney v.
New York, N.H. & Hart. R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 40 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960)
(Lumbard, C.J., dissenting) (without the instruction manyjurors believe the award taxabTe and
weigh this factor against defendant).2
'
7 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found the tax consciousness of the
American public to be so notorious as to justify the court in taking judicial notice thereof.
Domeracki v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 443 F.2d 1245, 1251 (3d Cir. 1971). See also
McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & Hart. R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 41 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
870 (1960) (Lumbard, C.J., dissenting); Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 346, 251
S.W.2d 42, 45 (1952).
258 See Coleman v. New York City Transit Authority, 37 N.Y.2d 137, 150, 332 N.E.2d
850, 858, 371 N.Y.S.2d 663, 674 (1975) (Jasen, J., dissenting); Dempsey v. Thompson, 363
Mo. 339, 346, 251 S.W.2d 42, 45 (1952); Nordstrom, supra note 242, at 233.
2'9 Coleman v. New York City Transit Authority, 37 N.Y.2d 137, 150, 332 N.E.2d 850,
858, 371 N.Y.S.2d 663, 674 (1975) (Jasen, J., dissenting); Domeracki v. Humble Oil & Ref.
Co., 443 F.2d 1245, 1251 (3d Cir. 1971). See also McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & Hart.
R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 41 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960) (Lumbard, C.J., dissenting).
260 See Coleman v. New York City Transit Authority, 37 N.Y.2d 137, 150, 332 N.E.2d
850, 858, 371 N.Y.S.2d 663, 674 (1975) (Jasen, J., dissenting); McWeeney v. New York, N.H.
& Hart. R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 40 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960) (Lumbard, C.J.,
dissenting). See also Morris & Nordstrom, Personal Injury Recoveries and the Federal Income Tax
Law, 46 A.B.A.J. 274 (1960).
261 The instruction typically requested is similar to that given by the trial court in
Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 251 S.W.2d 42 (1952), where the court charged:
You are instructed that any award made to plaintiff as damages in this case, if any
award is made, is not subject to Federal or State income taxes, and you should not
consider such taxes in fixing the amount of any award made plaintiff, if any you
make.
Id. at 346, 251 S.W.2d at 45.
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sion.262 In the final analysis, an instruction on taxation would be a
readily understood statement of the law,263 taking nothing from
plaintiffs while protecting the rights of defendants to be free from
unduly inflated verdicts.
262 See Feldman, Personal Injury Awards: Should Tax-Exempt Status Be Ignored?, 7 Aiuz. L.
REv. 272, 280 (1966).
263 37 N.Y.2d at 145, 332 N.E.2d at 855, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 670 (1975). Apparently, there
has been a tendency among courts to confuse the evidentiary issue of proving lower damages
by showing a loss of net earnings rather than gross income, with the issue of instructing the
jury on the nontaxability of the final award. See Domeracki v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 443
F.2d 1245, 1250 (3d Cir. 1971). In Highshew v. Kushto, 235 Ind. 505, 134 N.E.2d 555,
(1956), for example, the court, in denying a request for jury instructions concerning the
tax-exempt nature of the award, stated that "[sluch subject matter would involve intricate
instructions on tax and non-tax liabilities . I... d. at 507, 134 N.E.2d at 556. This reasoning
may support exclusion of proof of net earnings; it is not applicable to the instruction issue.
See Burns, A Compensation Award for Personal Injury or Wrongful Death is Tax-Exempt: Should
We Tell the Jury?, 14 DE PAUL L. RFv. 320, 330 (1965); Morris & Nordstrom, Personal Injury
Recoveries and the Federal Income Tax Law, 46 A.B.A.J. 274, 275 (1960). Evidence of plaintiff's
tax liability on lost earnings has been appropriately criticized as being highly speculative and
for increasing the trial's complexity with a "parade of tax experts." See In re Marina
Mercante Nicaraguense, S.A., 364 F.2d 118, 126 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005
(1967); Stokes v. United States, 144 F.2d 82, 87 (2d Cir. 1944); D'Amico v. Resnik, 22 Misc.
2d 545, 548, 197 N.Y.S.2d 826, 828-29 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1960); Nordstrom, supra
note 242, at 231. Jury instructions as to the tax-exempt nature of personal injury awards,
however, are not subject to these infirmities and impose no new burdens on the finders of
fact. See McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & Hart. R.R., 282 F.2d 34, 39 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 870 (1960). Such instructions would merely caution the jury not to consider
taxation in determining the amount of damages. See note 261 and accompanying text supra.
